Vance in the Iran Debate
A Study in Attempted Influence
Discerning observers of the vice president (that is Veepologists) would have known an attack on Iran was imminent when VP Vance told The Washington Post:
The idea that we’re going to be in a Middle Eastern war for years with no end in sight — there is no chance that will happen.
This echoes the role Vance played defending the Iran strikes in June, when he argued that while foreign military interventions are bad in general, Trump “has earned some trust on the issue.”
But according to reports, within administration councils Vance was generally believed to be a skeptic of attacking Iran, along with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine.
They obviously failed in their efforts to nudge President Trump away from attacking Iran. They were no match for the imprecations of Israel’s Prime Minister and the Saudi Princes. Trump does love royalty. But the approach Vance used highlights the working of vice-presidential influence.
General Doubts
Numerous news outlets reported on General Caine’s skepticism about an Iran operation. Caine had had high confidence in the Venezuela operation but was much less certain about attacking Iran.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is a statutory member of the National Security Council as the president’s adviser on military affairs, not a participant. This is a subtle difference and often it doesn’t matter much—what matters is being the room where the decision is made. Still, American military leaders tend to tread carefully in giving advice. They are the experts on military affairs and can give informed advice on the military options: their risks, the likelihood of success, and the potential impacts of a military operation. But the Chairman is not supposed to advocate for a position. Again, the line between giving advice and giving an opinion is not always clear, but this Chairman tries to stay on the right side of it.
Caine could not come out say: Attacking Iran is a bad idea. He could point out risks such as less certainty the operation would work as well as the Venezuela operation or that the U.S. military is running low on critical and hard to replace munitions.
For Caine this approach also has the virtue of maintaining his relationship with Trump. The Chairman during Trump’s first term, Mark Milley, openly confronted Trump. This is not an approach that has worked well for anyone. But Caine’s lower-key technocratic approach isn’t just about Trump—it is about maintaining the appropriate place of the military in the United States and protecting it from politicization. This strategy may not be working, but the logic is clear.
Vance’s Dance
The Vice President faces a similar challenge. Nothing statutory prevents the vice president from speaking their mind, but there are political risks to doing so. When Vice President Hubert Humphrey expressed doubts about the Vietnam War, President Lyndon Johnson cut him off. His protégé, Walter Mondale made sure that as Jimmy Carter’s vice president he fully aired his opinions either in private or in small groups. Leaks about disagreements between the president and vice president are bad for both of them.
Recent vice presidents have followed this mode of operations and Vance is no exception. In Signalgate and during the bombing of Iran last year, Vance’s skepticism of foreign adventures was made clear. But in White House meetings, rather than argue, Vance asked neutral questions of Caine that emphasized concerns about the mission.
For someone within the administration and opposed striking Iran, this was probably the smartest play to make. It echoes the approaches of previous influential vice presidents, who emphasized discretion and loyalty. Sometimes smart plays don’t work, but exercising prudence in internal debates will preserve the participant’s status and keep powder dry for future battles.