Prologue on Bureaucracy
In his memoir, Mark Esper (Secretary of the Army and later Defense under Trump) writes that improving the situations for military families was a top priority for him. He learned that it took a military spouse about 130 days to be hired for a position at a military installation. This was too long and a huge source of stress and unhappiness for military families. Installation officials thought 130 days for hiring was moving quickly. Esper thought it should be 45 days and initiated a process to analyze the hiring process step by step to reduce the timeline. He succeeded in reducing it to 90 days.
I mention this to highlight just how difficult it is to get things done in the U.S. government—even without political opposition or bureaucratic obstruction.
We establish bureaucracies to reduce uncertainty. Bureaucracies are enormous bundles of standard operating procedures. The vast scale of the U.S. drives these bureaucracies to become increasingly complex. Although it was written nearly four decades ago, James Q. Wilson’s Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It remains the essential guide.
As you consider various Trump claims about massive changes and reforms, keep this in mind.
Measuring the Cabinet
There’s a simple frame for understanding Trump’s nominations (so far), and frames in political science mean a 2x2.

I haven’t covered every single appointee, but you get the idea.
First factor in evaluating Trump’s nominees: are they traditional Republicans or Trumpers and are they competent or not. The first of these two variables is pretty clear. Everyone in the GOP has had to pay obeisance to Trump, but which of these nominees are people who might serve in any GOP administration, and which would only appear in a Trump administration? Marco Rubio and Doug Burgum could easily hold a position in any GOP administration. RFK Jr., Linda McMahon, and Matt Gaetz seem less likely figures.
Competence is a tough category to evaluate. People who on paper look excellent can be disasters and strange picks can surprise. It is very hard to be a high-level government executive—the very nature of the position means that few truly succeed. The ideal government executive knows the topic, has experience running a large-scale enterprise, and most importantly knows how to handle an agency’s constituencies (this includes, Congress, interest groups, the press, the president, and the agency’s workforce.) James Q. Wilson explains that support from external constituencies reduces uncertainty about the organization’s standing and enables the executive to pursue policy changes. The president is a key constituency, but if that’s the executive’s only source of support, the president will need to be prepared to invest a lot of political capital into that department. Counting on Trump’s support, especially if there is a lot of negative news about agency actions, may prove a weak reed.
Doug Burgum might be an optimal pick for the Department of Interior. He’s been a businessman and governor of a Western state, so he has administrative experience and experience with land-use and environmental issues. As a politician he has experience working with different communities and organizations and given his background he is not an unknown to the specific constituencies most interested in the Department of Interior.
First Caveat: Republicans are going to Republican and Democrats and going to Democrat. If you are a staunch environmentalist, you are probably not going to be thrilled with Burgum, who will approve expanded economic activity on federal lands. But he’ll do it through standard mechanisms. He will at least give lip service to environmental concerns, and he may surprise. There are conservative and libertarian ideas about protecting the environment that are worth exploring.
Second Caveat: Competence is a floor. A competent government executive runs their department without embarrassing the administration, demanding too much of the president, and maybe advances administration goals or makes some fixes to the department. Being a government executive is hard; few are truly outstanding.
Kristi Noem, at DHS, is an interesting contrast with Burgum. While Burgum is a pretty standard GOP figure, Noem is on the Trumpista side. I’d also rate her as less competent than Burgum. That might be sexism on my part (old white guy vs. youngish woman), but I don’t think so. She is also a skilled politician, having served in Congress and as Governor, and brings some administrative experience. DHS is a vast archipelago of agencies with critical, but often unrelated functions—many of which can quickly boil over to crisis. Noem will have a steep learning curve to master the vast array of issues that will cross her desk. The other thing is Noem’s personal weirdness factor, which raises questions about her ability to avoid major scandals and embarrassments at an agency with so many high-profile functions.
There aren’t many gold-standard candidates. A congressperson with little administrative experience but knows the issues can be effective (think Mel Laird at DOD) or an utter disaster (Les Aspin, also at DOD). A skilled political executive who doesn’t know the issues can learn the brief (John Connally at Treasury). Someone who knows the issues but has no political experience can learn to build rapport with key constituencies (Steven Mnuchin at Treasury.) Of course, someone with all the appropriate skills and knowledge can just not work out (Paul O’Neill at Treasury.)
Many of Trump’s picks seem destined for failure. Gaetz is already out. RFK Jr., Hegseth, and Gabbard will all face huge barriers to confirmation. Assuming they make it, given their limited knowledge of their domain, lack of experience running large organizations, and checkered background—none is well positioned to a successful tenure at their department.
RFK Jr. would be miserable at HHS. First, it is a vast and unmanageable bureaucracy (not unlike DOD in scale) and he has no administrative experience or deep knowledge of its issues. Second, he is already coming in with a lot of skeptics. Third, HHS doesn’t really deal with the healthy eating issues that RFK Jr. states will be his priority (a bit at FDA, but really it’s the Department of Agriculture.) Finally, and this is the not so hidden bomb, HHS includes the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). Anything touching on immigration policy will be hot in this administration, but it was ORR that ended up responsible for the children separated from parents by the Trump administration. If the Senate fails to confirm him, RFK Jr. will have dodged a bullet.
Linda McMahon is an interesting case. I would not write off an extraordinarily successful businesswoman (who has a flair for showmanship) as incompetent. Further, she ran the Small Business Administration and was well-regarded. She has very limited experience with education policy, but she can learn the brief.
Trump has promised to eliminate the Department of Education, but he can’t do this without Congress. This threat makes Democrats hyperventilate, but has education in the U.S. improved since the Department of Education was established in 1979? If Trump can muster the Congressional support to eliminate the Department, it has several functions that will have to go somewhere (probably back to HHS, which used to be Health, Education, and Welfare.) If they do this, it’ll be more heartache for RFK Jr. at HHS.
The GOP attitude towards the Department of Education raises an interesting question. One strategy for federal executives is discombobulating their agency. A lot of Congressional Republicans really hate the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (they believe it is insufficiently accountable to Congress.) Killing an agency is hard, but in the first Trump term, Mick Mulvaney was the director. He put on a master class on how to obstruct an agency from the inside. It’s possible that McMahon could do the same at Education.
Where Power Lies
The competent traditional Republicans are going to prestigious foreign policy jobs (State and UN Ambassador) or jobs with major environmental portfolios (Interior and EPA.) The foreign policy gigs are high-profile (and can set someone up for future office.) At the UN, Elise Stefanik will build her reputation beating up on America’s favorite international punching bag. Rubio at State will probably get to take a lot of trips to countries that Trump doesn’t care about. Given that Trump believes himself a master negotiator and strategist, Rubio will probably not be a key player.
But the competent Trumpistas are going to the White House.
Stephen Miller studied immigration policy for years and then had Trump’s first term to figure out how to implement changes. You may not like his policy preferences, but he knows his brief.
There is an old policy adage: show me your budget and I’ll tell you your policy. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is the real steering mechanism of the U.S. government (it also oversees the regulatory process.) Russ Vought was acting OMB chief for part of the first Trump administration and since has been working diligently on Project 2025. Someone else who knows his brief.
Susan Wiles, the White House chief of staff, is an experienced political operator. What I have noticed is that under her guidance, Trump-world is leaking a lot less. Maybe that’s a temporary state, but it seems to speak well of her ability to run a tight ship at the White House and manage her mercurial principal.
Mike Walz, the incoming National Security Advisor, has strong credentials and is probably closer to a traditional internationalist Republican. I’m not sure how it plays in, but his wife is hella impressive and worked in the first Trump White House. Most National Security Advisors have either been old foreign policy hands or academics. Walz is also a Congressperson—that’s new and could bring some critical new perspective to this all-important position.
While lots of presidents claim they want to return to cabinet government, the reality is that governance is increasingly centralized in the White House. Trump may be doing some galaxy-brain stuff with his cabinet nominees (loyalty tests to the GOP Senators, distraction from what he’s really trying to do), or he could just be the same chaos-monkey we all learned to know and love back in the late teens. Either way, watch the staffing at the White House.
You’ve written like 5 pages about the Trump transition, but isn’t this publication about vice presidents?
Implications for Vice President Vance
First, Vance has a rival. Rubio is also young and has ambitions. Secretary of State is comparable to the vice presidency. Both positions are prestigious, but reliant on the president for power. The VP has no significant formal power. In theory, the Secretary of State has power as the head of the first department of the nation, but the State Department doesn’t have many goodies to hand out to domestic interests. Thus, the Secretary of State is challenged in building support from external constituencies. To influence policy, they need the president to be interested in what they have to say. To negotiate effectively with other countries, the Secretary of State needs the president’s support.
Secretaries of State and VPs have been rivals in the past (Biden and Clinton under Obama, Quayle and Baker under Bush Sr.) Vance has the obvious advantage over Rubio, he’ll be in the White House with Trump much of the time. But Trump is fickle and may get tired of his VP. Vance has a long history of ingratiating himself with powerful mentors, a skill that will serve him well dealing with Trump. Rubio, who has been in the Senate for over two terms, brings far more real policy and political knowledge to the table than Vance. Rubio may be able to score, or help Trump score, policy wins or bring realistic options to the president.
Should the administration implode, a Secretary of State is better placed to distance themselves from disaster than a Vice President.
I’ve written before that Vance’ s prospects for influence in the Trump administration are limited. Vance has limited policy or political experience. His insights on the Senate or the intelligence community (areas where many past VPs have been helpful) will be limited. With Musk and Ramaswamy at DOGE (Ramaswamy is another potential Vance rival), Vance may not be assigned serious task forces (Pence wasn’t.)
That being said, back in 2016 I predicted that Pence would be influential as Trump’s VP. Since I was completely wrong, I have to grant that Vance could emerge as Trump’s eminence grise.
I’d argue that Pence WAS influential, just not on Trump. But Pence’s refusal to go along with Trump’s reindeer games on Jan 6 showed that he had at least a modicum of respect for our country and democracy. He used his influence then. I don’t think Vance has that same dedication and moral fortitude.