Make Congress Relevant (on Foreign Policy) Again
Throwback Thursday (with a little Veeply Round-up)
It’s a busy time for your humble Veepologist. Lots of VP news, but also I’m writing a pair of papers for the Southern Political Science Association next week in New Orleans and preparing the syllabus for my spring class on U.S. foreign policy.
But for Throwback Thursday, I’m reposting my June 23, 2025 post on the Congressional role in foreign policy. I have a modest institutional reform that might help.
But I cannot ignore all the VP news out there so first:
A mini-Veeply Roundup
In my last post I argued that VP Vance’s absence from the Mar-a-Lago situation room made sense for operational security reasons. I cited an oddly resonant past example. I’ve read some good counter-arguments that it was Vance strategically distancing himself. From the outside, we cannot know what really happened, I will only say that they were solid arguments and my take may have been wrong.
Second, I’ve written before on the feud between the president and vice president of Bolivia. Well that fight is escalating quickly. There are very good analyses from The Bolivia Brief and the Latin America Risk Report. Long and short, Bolivia’s president issued a Supreme Decree that states that the president is still governing when abroad. Previously executive authority passed to the VP when the president was out of the country. With Bolivia’s economy in shambles, the VP has joined the opposition to the president. This change is an attempt to prevent a coup when the president is travelling.
Here in the U.S. we’ve seen this type of conflict between Governors and Lt. Governors. There was a feud between Gov. Brown and Lt. Gov. Mike Curb in California in the 1970s where Curb would appoint judges and make policy when Brown was out of state. More recently, North Carolina Lt. Gov. Mark Robinson would try to seize power whenever Governor Roy Cooper left the state. Robinson is an utter buffoon who shouldn’t be left in charge of anything for more than a New York second.
Make Congress Relevant (on Foreign Policy) Again
The U.S. attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities has put Congress’ increasing irrelevance in foreign affairs in sharp relief.1 Congress has the authority required to retake its inherent power. An array of problems has prevented Congress from doing so, including:
Lack of Incentives. Congresspeople, especially representatives, focus on issues most important to their constituents—which rarely includes foreign policy.
Deference to the Executive. Historically Congress has deferred to the president on foreign policy and national security given the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief.
Presidential Resources. The President has far greater resources (direct access to information and authorities) for acting on the global stage, including an extensive national security staff.
Collective Action Problems. Even in the best of times it can be difficult for Congress to act. Add the above points, and Congressional leadership has had little interest in taking on the hard fight to restore Congressional supremacy, or at least parity, with the President.
In considering this issue I have my students at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy read a book chapter written by former Congressman Lee Hamilton of Indiana.2 Hamilton, a Democrat, served in Congress from 1965 to 1999. He was co-chair of the 9/11 Commission. The essay, however, was mostly based on his service on the National War Powers Commission, which issued its report in 2009.
The report and Hamilton’s essay both take the premise that the long trend, particularly after WW2 and the U.S. emergence as a global power, is that Presidents have been increasingly able to act in foreign policy and national security (I’ll use these terms interchangeably to cover both) without Congressional approval or even input. This is most critical on the all-important question of going to war. There was a brief period in which Congress reclaimed authority in the 1970s, but the general trend returned under Reagan and accelerated dramatically after 9/11. The War Powers Act of 1973, passed to limit presidential war-making powers, failed curb executive power.
Hamilton argues that, in general, Congressional engagement in foreign policymaking leads to stronger foreign policy. It provides a stronger legal and political underpinning for policies. There is an interesting discussion on whether the attacks on Iran are unconstitutional, but as a leading expert noted, the Constitution is unclear.
The Constitution is not an end. It is a means “to form a more perfect union… and secure the Blessings of Liberty…”
To this point, Hamilton makes a strong argument that Congressional engagement can improve the policy itself. As an example, Hamilton discusses Senator Vandenberg’s discussions with Secretary of State Marshall post-war aid to Europe, which became known as the Marshall Plan. Hamilton also describes in-depth the savings from Senator Truman’s oversight of military expenditures during World War II. Hamilton observes that the President and their advisors are in a bubble and that Congresspeople, who are closer to their constituents, can offer valuable insight on foreign policy that the president may not hear elsewhere. To properly conduct oversight and use the power of the purse to improve foreign policy, Hamilton exhorts members of Congress to take their oath of office seriously and to do their job.
On the all-important issue of war, the Commission Report proposes legislation that would require presidents to consult Congress on decisions to go to war at regular intervals. It would also create a mechanism for Joint Congressional Resolutions approving or disapproving Presidential war-making. To institutionalize this consultative process, the proposed legislation calls for a Joint Congressional Consultation Committee consisting of committee chairs and ranking members of the major foreign policy committees, the minority leaders of both houses, and chaired (on a rotating basis) by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader.
I ask my students if they think these mechanisms will have much effect, and they generally agree that it will not. But the Commission Report has a buried lede:
Congress shall employ a permanent, bipartisan joint professional staff to facilitate the work of the Joint Congressional Consultation Committee under the direction of its Chairman and Vice Chairman. The members of the Joint Congressional Consultation Committee and the professional staff shall be provided all relevant national security and intelligence information.
A National Security Council for Congress
In the National Security Act of 1947, the establishment of a small staff to assist the president with national security matters was a minor item, a throwaway. The act created the CIA, re-organized the military by merging the Department of War and the Department of the Navy into the Department of Defense, and established the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC was intended as sub-cabinet for national security, bringing together the heads of the major relevant departments. While the formal meetings between the top cabinet secretaries or their deputies are important—the real action is the NSC staff. The modest administrative staff proposed in the 1947 Act, has grown to over 100 (and sometimes many more) and serves as the institutional mechanism by which the president directs foreign policy.
The NSC interacts with the broader national security bureaucracy at the top level but also reaches much farther down through a network of interagency committees. NSC staffers can gather information and options, without limiting the president to information provided by cabinet secretaries. The staffers can also oversee the implementation of the president’s agenda, flag issues, and provide independent analysis.
The Commission and Hamilton are advocating the same capacity for Congress. It is an old saw that it takes a bureaucracy to engage a bureaucracy. Congress has embraced this strategy, establishing new committees and in some cases new agencies, to enable Congress to deal with new agencies in the Executive Branch. It can often take Congress decades to do this. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was formed nearly three decades after the CIA was established. When an executive move infringes directly on Congressional prerogatives, Congress acts more quickly. Just a few years after the Bureau of the Budget was reorganized into the Office of Management and Budget in 1970, Congress established the Congressional Budget Office to protect its “power of the purse.”
On national security, Congress is still structured for the pre-World War 2 U.S. government. Congressional committees (like executive departments) protect their turf and tend to their own matters. The Foreign Relations Committees oversee the State Department, the Armed Services Committees oversee the Defense Department, etc. No one in Congress is well-placed to see the increasingly complex big picture which touches on economics, technology, and an array of other issues. Individual members of Congress may become experts and Congressional leadership have advisors. But there is no dedicated body that can advise Congress as a whole (or at least its leaders.)
This Congressional NSC (CNSC) can parallel the NSC and interface directly with it. The CNSC will ensure that members are well-informed on issues, provide independent analysis, and help to coordinate the relevant Congressional committees in their oversight and budgeting roles.
There would be bureaucratic challenges to making this new body work. The NSC answers to the president. The CNSC would answer to many masters (the House and Senate, famously have different priorities). Today’s hyper-partisanship might render this body ineffective. But there are also reasons this body could be effective. First, on serious issues of national security, behind closed doors, Congressional leadership may be far more thoughtful and sober than is seen in public. Second, this body will attract highly skilled foreign policy professionals, becoming an engine to drive decision-making and policy.
The world is becoming more complex and dangerous, addressing the coming challenges will require creativity and resolve. Congress can provide new perspectives on and political support for the policies needed to meet challenges of the 21st century. To fulfill this historic role in the face of what will be a turbulent century, to provide wise advice and craft innovative policies, Congress needs its own counselors.3
I used to do Middle East and terrorism stuff. I have thoughts, but so does pretty much everyone else on these here innerwebs!
Another high-profile Hoosier in Congress, Indiana isn’t just our national vice president factory. They really punch above their weight in our national politics and culture.
No mention of VPs? None? What is this newsletter about anyway? OK, here’s one, the rise in vice presidential influence is a case study in how capable staff can enable a player within the decision-making process.