Does Targeting Cartel Leaders Work?
Lessons from Counter-Terrorism
Yesterday the Mexican military “removed” Jalisco cartel drug lord “El Mencho.” His actual name is Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes and his organization is formally Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). Here’s a great analysis from James Bosworth, my go-to for all things Latin America. Here’s in-depth background from InsightCrime.
I’m no expert on Mexico (they don’t have a vice president—a post for another time.) But a big part of my work on vice presidents is thinking about leadership in general (including terrorist groups and criminal organizations.) Years ago I wrote one of the first statistical analyses of the impact of removing terrorist leaders. At the time, the prevailing wisdom was the “snakehead strategy.” Killing or arresting terrorist leaders would make the organization collapse; cut the head off the snake.
My analysis was simple: I looked at a group’s activity in one and five years before losing its number one or number two leader and compared it to the group’s activity after losing its number one or number two leader. These leaders could have been killed, captured, or died of natural causes. I had a control group of comparable terrorist groups that had not lost a leader.
My findings were, at best, mixed. Some groups, particularly the smaller leftist groups that prevailed in Europe in the 1970s, folded after their leaders were arrested, although that was usually accompanied by large-scale arrests of their cadres. Larger groups had more robust command and control and often survived, sometimes becoming deadlier.
It was not a particularly good paper. It was published in a student journal, not a peer-reviewed journal. But it was one of the first on the topic (and it was cited in The New Yorker!) There have been other studies since. Some also found that the decapitation strategy is often not effective, yet others have found it works well. As a matter of common sense, a capable army will not collapse if you eliminate a top general. Terrorist organizations that survive need to also be capable organizations with strong command and control.
I ended my paper with Tolstoy’s quote from Anna Karenina: “All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”
Terrorist groups are unhappy families, unique in their grievances, means of support, operations, and organizational structure. There are some terrorist organizations where decapitation will result in a loss of effectiveness or even collapse. Even if decapitation isn’t effective, far be it from me to tell the president of the United States not to take out bin Laden because of my quantitative analysis. There are other reasons to target these leaders, including serving justice and political needs—which cannot be ignored in political decision-making.
Defeating Terrorism by Attacking Middle-Management
In terms of practical counter-terrorism, removing mid-level leaders and experts may have a higher long-term pay-off than taking out the chiefs. Low-level figures can be replaced and robust terrorist organizations usually have an executive council or politburo with multiple figures who can step into the top job. But mid-level operatives with expertise—whether tactical, financial, or logistical—require time to develop skills. Removing these figure decreases the organization’s overall capabilities and increases the cognitive load on other leaders.
Some of the most successful counter-terror campaigns, like Israel’s recent defeat of Hezbollah, combined targeting mid-level figures with an ultimate attack on the top leader. When Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah was killed in 2024, the ranks beneath him were so depleted that no major military commanders were available to take charge. The Secretary-General position went to long-time Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem, who no one had considered a potential successor because his work was on the political side. Hezbollah probably still has a strong home game (don’t go to Lebanon to fight them), but their away game is devastated.
Does this Apply to Cartels?
It isn’t clear that this analysis of terrorist groups applies to criminal groups.
The U.S. and Mexico are good at collaborating to take out top cartel leaders, but cartel crime and the violence continue. The violence may be falling in Mexico, but there is no sign of a major reduction in drug trafficking. El Mencho’s removal from the scene led to a spate of violence across the country. Even if this dies down, the infighting to take control of the organization can lead to an increase in violence. Awash in cash, there are big incentives to do whatever it takes to control even part of a cartel’s operations.
This paper finds that just as attacking the mid-level figures in terrorists groups can be effective, it appears the same may hold true for Mexican cartels may be the more effective strategy for disrupting cartel operations. Does targeting the top leaders, who have lots of security, use resources needed to go after the middle-management?
Don’t Target the Top Leaders?
A study of gangs in Chicago, which may apply to criminal organizations in general, found that lower-level figures want to engage in violence to build their reputation. Higher-ups seek to minimize violence because it leads to feuds with other gangs and attracts police attention which interferes with making money.
Could the Mexican government reach a modus vivendi with cartel lords in which they were safe if they kept the violence to a minimum and accepted actions against their criminal activities as a cost of doing business?
It could work, but criminals should be arrested, tried, and imprisoned. Secure crime lords will still contribute to a culture of corruption which undermines the state.
From a straight policy standpoint there are important trade-offs between targeting or tolerating drug lords (regardless the mid-level figures should be pursued!) And then there are politics. Acting against crime lords also sends a message to the Mexican people and American politicians that the state is taking the threat seriously—even if this undermines longer-term security strategies.
To bring it to vice presidents (as we must): in a well-run administration VPs, as experienced politicians, are well-equipped to help the president balance these trade-offs, oversee and implement the policy, and advance it politically. Mexico doesn’t have a VP, but their president has proven capable and may not need one.