107 Days: Harris Re-Hashes 2024
An Inadvertently Revealing Campaign Memoir
In her campaign diary 107 Days, Kamala Harris succeeds in explaining her 2024 election loss, but not in the way she had hoped. Her argument was that 107 days, the time she had to campaign for president after President Biden dropped out of the race, was not enough time for a winning campaign. The strength of the book are the intimate details of running for president, but this focus on minutiae illustrates her campaign’s strategic failure.1
The Tyranny of the Immediate
Harris’ account is properly a diary, a record of day-to-day events, rather than a journal engaging in self-reflection. She describes rally after rally after interview after interview. Harris tells us how much money she raised and how many people attended the rallies. These are interspersed with time she had to spend being vice president, such as heading to the situation room when Iran launched a missile barrage at Israel or working with FEMA when storms struck the southeast.
Running for president, or any major political office, is exhausting. It took a toll on Harris, her family, and her staff.
But Harris’ best numbers were when she entered the race, then they stagnated into a dead heat with Donald Trump (who was never particularly popular.) The rallies, the interviews, and money weren’t moving the needle, yet Harris’ answer was not to ask why they weren’t working, but to keep pushing forward, doing more of the same.
Under the October 3 entry, Harris writes:
At a strategy meeting in early August, [campaign manager] Jen O’Malley Dillon advised that we really needed to bring Trump’s numbers down [no shit Sherlock my note], since the universe of undecided voters had contracted. The time for persuasion, she said, was earlier in the cycle and had passed. People were going home to their base.
Time is the most valuable commodity in any campaign, in one as brief as ours. I was glad to give some time to campaigning with Liz Cheney in the hope that we could reach those Republicans who believe, as we do, that fundamental principles of democracy should never be partisan issues.
At least the appearance was in swing state Wisconsin. But the solution to bringing down Trump’s poll numbers is campaigning with the daughter of the guy who got us into Iraq? I truly admire Liz Cheney, but the idea that she was the key to reducing Trump’s support seems pretty unlikely, at least in retrospect.
In the October 10 entry Harris writes about a televised forum with undecided Latino voters:
The Latino vote began to steadily drift away from us, starting in 2016. The Latino vote is no monolith, and a variety of factors were at play. …inflation was certainly a factor. Though I had a jobs and investment agenda that would have benefited Latinos, it was rolled out October 22nd—too late to really resonate.
This plan is a 13 page laundry list of initiatives (which may have been cut, pasted, and lightly edited from other campaign documents). Would this bland campaign document have really resonated, even if there was plenty of time to sell it? And why did this typical campaign fare take over 90 days to release? Campaigns need to move fast.
The biggest play her campaign tried was to get Trump to debate her again. She did well in her debate with Trump (her description of the grueling debate prep is interesting). She had done well against Trump and against Pence in 2020. But Trump (or at least his team) knew another debate was a bad idea and refused. Relying on your opponent to make the moves you want isn’t a great strategy.
Harris played small ball.
I’m sympathetic. As a woman of color, Harris faced intense scrutiny of her every move. She had every reason to err on the side of caution. Further, Harris was a prosecutor. But trials are bounded games. There are limits on what can be said and done in a courtroom and a judge enforces these limits. Preparation time for a trial is critical. Debates are similar. In these fora, Harris did well. But elections are unbounded games. There is no person or institution (at least in current American politics) to declare things out of bounds. In this environment, Donald Trump, a creature of pure id will excel.
Shades of 1968
The most similar election in U.S. history was probably 1968, in which President Lyndon Johnson withdrew from the race in March—leaving his Vice President Hubert Humphrey as the party standard bearer.2
Johnson had seen his popularity decline, particularly in the face of the Vietnam war.
Humphrey believed in ending the war, but hesitated to break from Johnson. Harris was often frustrated by Biden’s ambivalent support of her candidacy. But LBJ was a vindictive man, more than ready to turn the vast powers of the presidency on Humphrey for any perceived slight.
Humphrey did, finally, break with LBJ on Vietnam and call for a halt to the bombing. His poll numbers began to rise—he rapidly closed the double-digit gap in polling—and the race became a dead heat when LBJ actually halted the bombing. It was a toss-up, but in the end, it went to Nixon.
The biggest campaign strategy decision (besides picking a running mate—which I discussed in a previous post and will write on further tomorrow) was on publicly breaking with Biden. Campaign advisor David Plouffe pushed hard for this, telling her bluntly, “People hate Joe Biden.”
Harris wouldn’t do it.3
Personality, Politics, and Vice Presidents
When talking about politics, discussing personalities is fun. But in political science structural factors are what matters. Harris’ fundamental situation was poor. Whatever the political maneuvering, vice presidents are viewed as a continuation of their president. Even following a popular two-term president is no guarantee of winning the “third-term.” Bush Sr. did it, and Nixon, (in 1960, and Gore, in 2000, came heartbreakingly close. Winning the second term for a president so unpopular that they had to bow out is far tougher.
Maybe there was nothing Harris could have done except step aside and allow a Democrat unaffiliated with the administration to run. But really, what politician would do that?
In 107 Days Harris can be funny (although she often steps on the best lines.) The details of campaigning are interesting. Her concern for people suffering and left out seems genuine. She did and does believe she is, “Kamala Harris for the people.” But the book spends lots of time relitigating tactical missteps that are endemic to a political campaign.
To take one example, in the August 29 entry Harris describes how in her first joint interview with running mate Tim Walz, CNN failed to use the standard “three-point set of key light, fill light, and back light that usually produces a flattering even tone.” In poor lighting she looked worn out and had to look up at Walz (who is a big guy.) Interesting detail, as is the Secret Service refusing to let her do the interview on the campaign bus because security features might be revealed.
As a woman in the public eye, Harris must be conscious of how she looks. This is unfair and Harris’ ire is understandable. But it’s still a bit petty.
Vice President Kamala Harris lost an election to Donald Trump, a seething mass of petty jealousy and hostility. 107 Days shows how driblets of this pettiness soiled Harris.
We have all been stained.
There are interesting similarities between Harris and Humphrey’s campaigns. There are also important differences. In 1968 a leading Democratic candidate, Robert F. Kennedy (dad of our current HHS Secretary) was assassinated—clearing the field for Humphrey. There was also a large third-party candidacy by segregationist George Wallace. But the fundamental choice of breaking with the president remains.
Harris argues that highlighting her policy disagreements with Biden would have “opened the door to a discussion that is backward-looking rather than forward-looking.” She also felt that since Biden was still president, she had to maintain a trusting relationship with him. Although Biden was unpopular, there wasn’t a simple issue (like bombing Vietnam) for Harris to emphasize. Inflation doesn’t lend itself to simple answers. It is also possible that she did not want to turn on Biden whose long career as a public service had come to such a sorry end.